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- From: wietse@wzv.win.tue.nl (Wietse Venema)
- Newsgroups: alt.security
- Subject: Re: An alternative to setuid shell scripts
- Message-ID: <2912@wzv.win.tue.nl>
- Date: 4 Feb 92 22:28:23 GMT
- References: <1992Feb3.225508.25053@aio.jsc.nasa.gov>
- Organization: Eindhoven University of Technology, The Netherlands
-
- barrett@ial4.jsc.nasa.gov (Jim Barrett) writes:
-
- >I have an interface program, called uid_if (User ID InterFace), written in C,
- >which provides a secure way to check for the presence of IFS or
- >LD_LIBRARY_PATH before /bin/sh is invoked.
-
- You'll want to check for other LD_xxx variables too. Someone told me about
- that after I posted my LD_LIBRARY_FIX article. A `strings /usr/lib/ldA.so'
- will do.
-
- >uid_if computes the name of the
- >script to execute based upon the value of argv[0], so if uid_if is linked to,
- >say, my_command, it will execute /secure/dir/my_command.sh when invoked.
-
- What happens if argv[0] is ../../some/other/place/bad_command.sh ?
-
- >I've attached an abbreviated version of the program to this article. I'd
- >appreciate any (hopefully constructive :-) feedback. Right now I use this
- >program to allow non-root users to become another non-root user, and I'm
- >considering using it in some root situations.
-
- Other programs that give controlled access to another UID are: opcom
- (comp.sources.unix), su-someone (comp.sources.misc) sudo (don't know).
- But it is unlikely that these know anything about the LD_xxx problem.
-
- Wietse
-
-